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The Economics of Implementing Traceability in Beef Supply Chains: 
Trends in Major Producing and Trading Countries 
 
Traceability is becoming an important instrument to assure food quality, particularly safety, in 
agri-food chains worldwide. Many countries are developing mandatory or voluntary programs using 
traceability to assure animal and beef safety. Motivations for their introduction arise from a variety of 
scientific, social, and economic factors. The systems being developed across countries differ significantly 
in their details giving rise to trade issues in international markets for live cattle and beef products. 
To date there is no full international agreement on the definition of traceability, although it is 
under intense discussion at the Codex Alimentarius Commission, World Trade Organization (WTO), and 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Generally traceability is defined as the ability to 
follow the movement of a food through specified stage(s) of processing, production, and distribution but 
other definitions are also in use. Golan et al. (2003a) characterize traceability systems by their breadth, 
depth, and precision. They define breadth as the amount of information recorded by the system, depth as 
how far backward and forward traceability is maintained, and precision as the ability of the system to 
pinpoint the original source of a problem. 
The full economic impacts of traceability systems are likely to be extensive. In addition to their 
impact on food safety, traceability systems affect animal health and production management decisions 
(Disney et al., Petit, Vitiello and Thaler). Traceability also affects the structure of supply chains because it 
requires coordination and allocation of costs and benefits among participants in order to work efficiently 
(Kola and Latvala). Consumers in different countries show varying levels of familiarity with and 
willingness to pay for traceability programs. According to Latouche, Rainelli, and Vermersch, French 
consumers are demanding increasing levels of transparency and traceability and would be willing to pay 
for it. Dickinson and Bailey suggest that a profitable market for traceability and transparency assurance 
systems might exist in the United States. Experiments conducted by Hobbs (2002, 2003) in Saskatchewan 
and Ontario, showed that Canadians would be willing to pay a premium of less than 10% for traceability 
on a beef sandwich worth C$2.50. 
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Across countries, a common factor spurring the development of traceability systems has been the 
presence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle and the suspected relationship between 
BSE and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in humans. The outbreak of BSE in the United Kingdom 
starting in 1984-1986 caused a sharp decline in consumer confidence in food producers and regulatory 
agencies. Similar reactions occurred in many other countries where BSE has been found. 
Here we discuss the economic implications of traceability in the beef industry, focusing on four 
areas of impact: human and animal health, liability, trade, and supply chain effects. We then describe the 
traceability systems being implemented in the seven largest beef producing and trading countries, in terms 
of the systems’ breadth, depth, and precision, and compare the systems’ relative advantages and 
disadvantages. 
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF TRACEABILITY SYSTEMS 
Public and private decisions to adopt traceability systems have important economic implications 
(Hobbs 2003, Golan et al. 2003b). There are different motivations to introduce traceability systems: while 
private firms are motivated by profits, public authorities are more interested in social welfare. Hence we 
would expect differences between traceability systems developed by private firms and those mandated or 
influenced by public authorities. The question of what is the efficient level of traceability and whether it is 
best attained by mandatory or voluntary rule is an important one (Golan et al. 2004). 
Traceability alone does not contribute to higher levels of safety or other quality attributes; it only 
transfers information along the supply chain. In order for traceability to affect quality it must be 
associated with some type of quality assurance mechanism that imposes a set of standards and procedures, 
and specifies data to be recorded, so that quality can be assured (Green and Hy). It is the sharing of 
information recorded by firms, or by other institutions to which it is passed, which constitutes the bulk of 
any traceability system. 
The economic and technical impact of traceability on the prevention of food safety hazards or in 
the assurance of other beef attributes will depend on the type of system that is implemented. A deeper 
system will enable the establishment of links among more agents further up or down a supply chain. 
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Increased precision means that the origin of an attribute can be more exactly identified (e.g., at the level 
of a group of animals versus an individual animal). Finally, a broader traceability system enables tracking 
of a larger variety of attributes throughout supply chains. Clearly, economic and technical decisions on 
which type of traceability system should be designed involve tradeoffs between system features and their 
related benefits and costs. Here we discuss four main economic impacts of traceability systems. 
Human and Animal Health 
The introduction of traceability systems into the beef supply chain has been motivated by human 
and animal health concerns. The adoption of traceability, along with regular testing of animals, enables 
authorities to quickly identify the sources of potential animal or human health hazards, limiting the 
chances of a wider spread of diseases. Animal identification has been used around the world to control a 
wide range of animal diseases, some of which are simultaneously dangerous to humans. Animal 
identification is the base for traceability systems in the beef supply chain. 
Traceability systems often need to be quite broad to prevent the main human and animal health 
consequences of food hazards. In most cases, the greater the numbers of potential hazards that are traced 
the higher are the costs. While some diseases originate in animals and spread through the chain, others 
appear or become more serious at the processing stage for beef, and still others have consequences only in 
animals. The depth of the system affects costs and different hazards require different types of systems. 
For example, prevention of BSE may require information back through animal feeding, while prevention 
of tuberculosis only requires information about farm practices. The level of precision in the system also 
affects costs. For example, for some diseases or attributes it is enough to identify the region of origin, but 
for others it is necessary to know which animal is the source of the hazard or attribute. 
Along with the costs of traceability, there are three categories of benefits in terms of human and 
animal health: a) public health benefits that relate to reduction of foodborne illness; b) private benefits 
associated with avoidance of bans on sales, mandatory destruction of assets, loss of reputation, and other 
adverse effects of breakdowns in quality assurance systems; and c) both private and public benefits from 
faster identification of the emergence and spread of new threats to animal and human health. 
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A key issue regarding the cost of traceability systems is who will pay for them. The question is 
important for health issues where there is a potential conflict between the social and the private optimum. 
Firms do not design traceability systems to maximize public health. However, they may trace attributes 
that contribute to public health if they believe that by doing so they can increase profits. If a regulator 
wants a higher level of traceability than firms are willing to provide, policies must be designed to move 
toward the socially optimum system. 
Liability 
Gathering and recording information facilitates better identification of the sources of risk. Such 
identification depends upon the breadth, depth, and precision of the traceability system. When traceability 
systems are in place, governments may operate more efficient monitoring and inspection programs 
because instead of directly monitoring agents in the food chain, they may instead check records and their 
truthfulness. The identification of sources of food hazards or the possible deliberate falsification of the 
information introduced into databases raises the question of liability. 
Liability implies that the source of a given hazard will be held responsible for the consequences 
of its actions. When it is impossible to identify correctly the source of hazards, it is difficult to hold agents 
accountable. In such cases there will be a weak effect on behavior due to liability (Buzby, Frenzen, and 
Rasco). Most opponents of mandatory introduction of traceability mention increased liability as a primary 
concern. 
If the costs of a food safety hazard are entirely imposed on a precisely identified source, the 
liability risk to the agent in the food chain is increased dramatically. There is also a positive side to 
liability for the whole industry or governments. It creates an incentive to use safer production and 
processing methods and to have a pro-active attitude toward identification and prevention of current and 
future sources of food hazards. This incentive prompted by liability may actually reduce the risks of food 
safety incidents as firms in an industry strive to avoid losing their reputations and the consumer’s trust. 
A clear private benefit of traceability systems is the possibility of proving that a given firm was 
not responsible or does not present a risk when safety issues arise. A firm that is able to prove it does not 
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have a given animal or public health problem will be less vulnerable to liability than one that cannot. 
Even if traceability alone does not guarantee safer foods, the information provided and the possibility of 
fast identification of hazards may diminish the risk perceived by consumers. 
Trade Effects 
 
Measures taken to protect against animal and human health hazards often limit international trade. 
The WTO allows member countries to impose sanitary barriers to trade under the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and such measures are recognized 
as legitimate if they are based on sound risk assessment and meet several other criteria. According to 
Hobbs (2003), mandatory traceability systems may be challenged at the WTO if they violate the rules 
defined in either the SPS Agreement or the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement. The question 
of what is a sound risk assessment or scientific justification to impose a safety trade barrier is debatable. 
The United States and other major exporters of food products constantly challenge EU and Japanese trade 
restrictions under the SPS Agreement, and to a much lesser extent under the TBT Agreement. 
When a major beef importer decides to impose a mandatory traceability system, it will require 
traceability on imported beef. Assuming such systems are not successfully challenged at the WTO, those 
countries adopting equivalent traceability systems will have better access to the markets of such importing 
countries. Producers or countries refusing to adopt equivalent traceability systems will lose markets. 
If markets where traceability becomes the standard pay higher prices, then exporting countries 
would be willing to adopt traceability as long as any higher costs are fully recovered. However, exporting 
countries with strict traceability could lose markets where traceability is not required because likely 
higher prices will hurt their competitiveness in those markets. This raises the important issue of 
harmonization of traceability systems. Harmonization would likely reduce disputes and lead to more 
transparent transactions but would also fail to accommodate regional differences in needs for such 
systems. 
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Supply Chain Impacts 
Traceability implies the flow of information about one or more attributes along the supply chain. 
The control of information is often an instrument of strategic competition, as most firms will only 
disclose private information if it benefits them. The more broad, precise, and deep the system of 
traceability is, the easier it will be to spot an individual producer or processor and hold it responsible for a 
hazard. In such cases the value of anonymity is lost. Hence there is some reluctance by producers and 
processors to join a traceability system. On the other hand public authorities may desire to have a very 
transparent supply chain, where information on a set of food safety attributes is widely shared along the 
chain and with authorities. 
Clearly there is a potential conflict between what authorities and firms dealing directly with 
consumers would like to know about the products and what those producing them are willing to disclose. 
Since there is a value to information, competition develops not only between firms at the same level of 
the supply chain but also between firms at different levels or among different supply chains according to 
the amount of information provided to consumers. 
A central economic question in supply chains is who bears the cost and who reaps the benefits of 
traceability. In most beef supply chains there are differences in market power among the firms and 
information on food safety attributes is subject to moral hazard and adverse selection. These differences 
will affect the division of the cost of introducing traceability between chain participants. When 
governments mandate traceability systems, the question is not only whether consumers want to pay for it 
through prices or taxes but also to whom that money will be paid. 
The design of traceability systems is affected by relationships established along supply chains; 
the relative power of participants; the breadth, depth, and precision needed; and the value consumers give 
to the information provided. All these factors also play an important role in the distribution of the benefits 
and costs of traceability. The general outline of these effects can be seen in comparing traceability 
systems already in place or being considered in the major producing and trading countries across the 
world. 
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TRACEABILITY SYSTEMS IN THE MAJOR BEEF PRODUCING 
AND TRADING COUNTRIES 
 
We used two main criteria to select countries for comparison: their importance in terms of world 
production and trade, and their experience with adoption of traceability systems in the beef supply chain. 
Table 1 compares the countries selected in terms of beef and veal production, exports, and imports. The 
United States and the European Union are both large producers and traders of beef. Australia, Canada, 
and, increasingly, Brazil export a large portion of their total production, while Argentina is a smaller 
exporter. Japan is a very important importer of beef. As discussed below, levels of exports and imports, as 
well as the size of domestic beef markets, have an important influence on the introduction of traceability 
systems. 
Four patterns of adoption are evident in the major producing and trading countries studied: 
adoption of mandatory systems in response to consumer concerns (EU and Japan), imposition of 
mandatory traceability to maintain or enhance export market shares (Australia, Brazil, and Argentina), 
industry managed mandatory programs for animal identification (Canada), and voluntary systems (United 
States). Table 2 provides an overall comparison of the systems described. 
European Union 
 
The European Union’s response to the BSE crisis was premised on the Single European Act of 
1986 that allowed the European Commission to propose measures giving consumers a “high level of 
protection.” The January 2000 White Paper on Food Safety contained the road map for the approach to 
food safety and new European legislation, specifying deadlines for the most important pieces of 
legislation. This document considered the sharing of information in a transparent, global, integrated, and 
harmonized way along the food chain and between different member states to be a primary means to 
regain consumer confidence. Following White Paper proposals, legislation on beef safety was issued in 
the summer of 2000: Regulation (EC) 1760/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council on July 
17th and Commission Regulation (EC) 1825/2000 on August 25th. Both regulations went into effect on 
September 1, 2000. 
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Regulation (EC) 1760/2000 establishes a system to identify, register, and label bovines and beef 
products. The objectives of this regulation are: 1) to establish an efficient system of identification and 
registration of bovines at the production stage and 2) to define a common European labeling scheme in 
the beef sector based on objective criteria at the marketing stage of the food chain. 
Under Title I, a mandatory system of animal identification is detailed using two individual ear 
tags, animal passports,1 and computerized databases in each member state to establish links between 
farms and abattoirs where animals are slaughtered. All records must be kept for at least three years, with 
records in the databases being kept and verified by designated national authorities. Hence, the system 
allows for a high level of precision in tracing any problem identified in post-mortem inspections. 
Under Title II, two labeling schemes are defined to assure traceability from slaughterhouse to 
retail. Section I, defines the “Compulsory Community Beef Labeling System” and section II the general 
rules of the “Voluntary Labeling System” allowing producers to extend the level of information provided 
to consumers. The compulsory system requires that each beef label must include a reference number or 
code, to ensure a clear link between meat and animal or groups of animals.2 Labels must also show the 
approval number and nationality of the slaughterhouse where the animal or animals were slaughtered. If 
the carcass or group(s) of carcasses is further processed, labels must indicate where those operations 
occurred. The regulation includes specifics on the labeling of these diverse situations. 
All producers or groups of producers who want to extend label information under the “Voluntary 
Labeling System,” must “send a specification for approval to the competent authority of the Member 
States in which production or sale of beef in question takes place.” This specification must include all 
information placed on the label, measures taken to assure those indications are accurate, a control system 
to verify the truthfulness of the indication along the food chain, and the name of an independent control 
                                                          
1 The animal passport is a document issued for each animal within 14 days after birth and is where several records 
on animal health, movements, and production processes are registered. Jones and Goldsmith, Turan, and Gow 
elaborate on the legal and economic impacts of animal passports. 
2 The definition of a group of animals to which a label must be linked is given in Article 4 of Reg. (EC) No 
1825/2000. 
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body complying with European Standard EN/45011. Through a procedure described in Article 17, 
producers in third countries may use a voluntary label system to export beef to the EU. 
Commission Regulation 1825/2000, the other regulation on beef safety issued in 2000, laid down 
detailed rules for the application of Reg. (EC) 1760/2000 in regard to compulsory and voluntary labeling 
schemes for beef and beef products. This regulation defines traceability as an identification system held 
by all groups of operators in the same or different parts of the beef supply chain, such that it allows for the 
establishment of links between meat and an animal or animals. This identification system must at least 
record information on any arrivals and departures of livestock, carcasses, and/or meat cuts between 
operators so that correlations are guaranteed. The regulation also defines the required reliability of 
information contained on labels and in all types of registers. Finally it establishes sanctions for 
noncompliance, which may include removal of beef from the market. 
Overall, the mandatory EU traceability system for beef is in theory quite precise and deep through 
its mandatory animal identification and compulsory labeling schemes. A possible pitfall of this system 
occurs in cutting plants where links are established with groups of animals rather than individual ones. 
The system’s breadth is narrow, though a supplementary voluntary scheme may further extend the 
breadth, depth, and even precision of traceability to include information demanded by consumers or retail 
chains on production practices, feed, cattle breeds, and other attributes. System precision may be further 
enhanced if DNA testing to confirm the information in databases is implemented as is being considered. 
In its present state of development the EU traceability system generates most of the economic 
impacts discussed above. The system of animal identification through passports enables authorities and 
producers to track animal diseases easily and quickly because the passport records every place the animal 
has been. Since the animal identification system is combined with compulsory labeling, human health 
hazards are also quickly identified and more easily controlled. The EU is leading the introduction of 
traceability system worldwide and is a main driver in establishing world standards. Mandatory traceability 
is likely to have significant impacts on beef supply chains within the EU, although this effect may differ 
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based on the sophistication of already existing private traceability systems. Recently published papers 
have started to analyze the economic impacts of the EU traceability system (Buhr, Meuwissen et al.). 
Japan  
 
Japan’s food safety legislation has been quickly changing since several BSE cases were identified 
in 2001. The fiscal year 2002 Annual Report on Food, Agriculture, and Rural Areas considers food safety 
to be a key issue. In July 2002 a law was passed requiring mandatory traceability from feedlots to packing 
plants. Each animal has to be identified using an ear tag and producers must record data on ID number, 
breed, sex, and production history. This produces a “family register” for the entire domestic herd. 
Beginning in 2003 Japanese authorities strengthened the traceability system, requiring its extension from 
producers through distribution to consumers. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries is 
formulating more legislation requiring livestock producers to record information on feed (Clemens). 
Japan already has succeeded in identifying the 4.5 million animals in its dairy and beef herd; full 
traceability from farm to fork is expected to be in force for all agents in the supply chain by December 
2004 (Fitzpatrick 2004) 
Japan’s traceability system has four levels (Fitzpatrick 2003b): 1) an ear-tag is attached to every 
living animal and a DNA sample is taken either when it is alive or slaughtered; 2) the DNA sample is 
enciphered with a 10-digit code corresponding to the animal’s ear tag and kept in a database maintained 
by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, with the database accessible by 
consumers and official authorities; 3) all animal health and feeding information is added to the database 
under the same enciphered code; and 4) every muscle and offal derived from each animal must retain the 
same 10 digit enciphered code with which it was originally identified. This code must be kept through 
every level of the processing and distribution chain. 
Pressed by consumers and in anticipation of enforcement of traceability, several Japanese 
supermarket chains, such as Jusco Supermarkets, are already providing traceability on high-value beef 
products (Clemens). Consumers can trace the beef they buy to the farm of origin using in-store computers 
or by accessing the internet at home. 
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Japan’s system will be similar in depth to that of the EU linking beef products from retail stores 
to farms of origin. While the traceability system is directed at domestically produced cattle, there are 
indications that it may be extended to imported cattle. Japanese supermarket chains seem to be 
anticipating this trend (Fitzpatrick 2003a). 
The depth of the Japanese system is enhanced relative to the EU system by the potential 
transparency of the system to consumers. If laws force producers to record information on feed, it will be 
even deeper. The traceability system will allow consumers to access information on animal production 
attributes such as date and place of birth, sex, breed, and production history. 
The Japanese mandatory system has more breadth than the European system, as it records 
information on the sex, breed, and details of the production process. Supermarkets have taken the role of 
assuring consumers on food quality and safety and they are designing broader traceability than required 
by law, as information on BSE testing, date of slaughter, number of carcass, slaughter number, and name 
of the producer is also included. Regarding precision, Japan’s traceability system is equivalent to the EU 
one, as each animal is identified and records are kept at the farm level, while movement of the animal and 
the products it originates are recorded in a database maintained by public officials. 
Given the similarities in the systems adopted, the economic impacts of mandatory traceability in 
Japan are likely to be similar to those experienced in Europe. The introduction of mandatory traceability 
in Japan is already having a major impact on beef trade. Japan is one of the biggest importers of beef and 
many of its suppliers are being forced to introduce traceability to have access to Japanese supermarkets. 
The economic impact is already clear in food chain dynamics as supermarkets give more information to 
consumers and take the lead in reorganizing the supply chain. 
Australia 
Australia is the world’s largest beef exporter; it is BSE free and is classified as Foot and Mouth 
Disease free by the OIE.3 In 1999, 65% of Australian beef and veal production was exported (AFFA). The 
                                                          
3 The OIE, an intergovernmental organization known as World Organization for Animal Health, was formed by 
international agreement and currently has 166 country members. 
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cattle industry and state and federal governments are deeply committed to maintaining the status quo and 
assuring Australia’s position as a quality leader. The Australian beef sector maintains voluntary Quality 
Assurance Systems for both grass and grain fed animals based on ISO 9002 norms, HACCP, and 
guidance from stakeholders, independent institutions, and public authorities on animal welfare issues 
(Meat and Livestock Australia 2002b). 
A limited form of traceability was implemented in Australia in the late 1960s as part of 
brucellosis and tuberculosis eradication campaigns. Under such programs, a Propriety Identification Code 
(PIC) was assigned to identify each farm; every animal on those farms had to be identified through a tail 
tag whenever it was moved away from the farm of origin. Using this system, every animal could be traced 
throughout the slaughter process to the farm of origin (Meat and Livestock Australia 2002b). 
The National Livestock Identification System (NLIS) using electronic identification was 
implemented on a voluntary basis by 1999 in all Australian States. This system became mandatory in the 
State of Victoria in January 2003. All plants processing for export are required to provide an accurate 
correlation between carcasses and PIC numbers for trace back purposes (Meat and Livestock Australia 
2002b). All other Australian state and territorial governments, along with the industry, have agreed on the 
goal of introducing the NLIS system on every ranch by July 2004 (Meat and Livestock Australia 2003b). 
The main motivation for the extension of NLIS is to support and enhance the competitiveness of the 
Australian cattle export sector and reduce the economic impact of potential animal disease outbreaks. 
The NLIS system uses an electronic ear tag or a rumen bolus, which is a device with a radio 
frequency transmitter placed in the animal’s stomach. Each electronic tag includes a unique number that 
is also printed on ear tags. Each animal is also identified with the PIC number on the tail, linking it to its 
farm of origin. Each animal movement is recorded in the national database. For example, when the animal 
leaves the farm, the producer’s agent, sales yard, or processor uses a device to read data on the electronic 
ear tag or rumen bolus and records information in the NLIS database. Hence, the system is precise to both 
the individual animal and geographical location. 
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NLIS is administered under the auspices of SAFEMEAT, an industry and government partnership 
to assure red meat safety and integrity. It is currently managed by Meat and Livestock Australia, which 
keeps the database. It developed the electronic tag system and software allowing easy access to the 
database. The system is funded through levies on producers and processors (Beasley). 
Traceability can be used to verify the origin and other attributes of beef for both domestic and 
export markets, though it is more commonly used in the export market. In terms of depth the Australian 
traceability system, establishes links from farm to the foreign port of import (unless the container number 
is retained in the importing country) as the PIC number is correlated to the carcass before it leaves the 
abattoir and the number of the exporting container is recorded in the NLIS database. The National Vendor 
Declaration provides an auditable trail of the animal’s history; it records information on the history of 
cattle before slaughter. It is legally enforced as vendors face prosecution and severe fines if they are 
negligent in maintaining this record or give false declarations (Meat and Livestock Australia 2002a). 
Registration errors are reduced to very low levels by use of electronic chips. Government officials verify 
the system in slaughterhouses (Meat and Livestock Australia 2002b). 
The NLIS traceability system, which is not yet mandatory in all Australian states, is similar in 
breadth to that of Japan. It includes farm of origin, movements, and information on specific diseases or 
‘high profile’ chemical residue risks. If required by the industry, the system may be expanded to include 
information on organic production status, welfare, or breed. Electronic animal identification is reportedly 
more accurate than alternative ear tag devices, making the NLIS system potentially more reliable than 
those in the EU and Japan. 
The system is not really comparable in depth to those of the EU and Japan because it only keeps 
registries of the carcasses in containers sent to international markets. Therefore there is no registry of all 
information from farm to fork. However, if the importing country introduced the data into a database it 
would be possible to associate products to NLIS records. 
Trade motivated the Australian traceability system. It was initially an initiative of the beef 
industry and therefore will presumably be able to capture most of the economic benefits discussed above 
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in terms of trade effects. Australian state and federal governments are promoting mandatory laws for 
traceability and have defined a support scheme to build essential infrastructure with a grant of A$5.4 
million (Thornton). However, there are still many producers that have not adopted traceability. They 
could lose both domestic and international markets to competitors, if the current trend toward more 
traceability persists, but they would have some cost advantages. The impact of traceability on food chains 
will depend on the relative costs of the identification systems and consumers’ attitudes. Supply chains 
where traceability was introduced have kept their clients in the Japanese market. The impact on animal 
and human health will be similar to that discussed for the EU and Japan, as the systems are equivalent in 
terms of breadth and precision. 
Brazil 
 
Brazilian beef exports have increased steadily over the last five years (FAOSTAT). According to 
the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute, Brazil had the third greatest market share in beef 
export markets in the period from 1998 to 2002 and is expected to become the second largest beef 
exporter by about 2010. Brazil still has to eradicate brucellosis and tuberculosis in its cattle herds but has 
BSE free status. New legislation introducing programs to control and eliminate animal diseases were 
issued in 2001 consisting of diagnosis and vaccination of herds. Similar legislation was instituted to 
control and eradicate Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Supply created the Brazilian System of Bovine 
and Buffalo Identification through Instructive Norm 1 in January 2002. Every bovine and buffalo born or 
imported must be individually identified, registered, and monitored though a procedure approved by the 
Ministry of Agriculture. The Brazilian cattle and buffalo herd is expected to be completely identified by 
the end of 2007. However traceability along the food chain is only required for producers and processors 
exporting premium beef; it establishes links from farm to slaughter and beef processing facilities. While 
currently only ear tags are allowed, recent consultations with the cattle industry are pressuring authorities 
to be more flexible on identification technologies (Lewis). 
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The system is being implemented over a period of years. All farms and feedlots exporting to the 
EU were required to have the new identification system in place by June 2002. Those exporting to other 
markets were required to have such a system ready by December 2003. Only identified cattle are to be 
exported. Every farm or feedlot located in regions free of Foot and Mouth Disease must be identified by 
December 2005 and the remaining by December 2007, when identification of all cattle herds will be 
mandatory. 
The Secretary for Animal and Plant Safety maintains an electronic database to control all 
identified animals. All registries on the database must be updated whenever animals are moved to other 
farms, to slaughter, or to processing plants. Private or public certification bodies, approved by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, visit farms, abattoirs, and processing facilities to verify the accuracy of registries. 
The system is precise to the level of the farm of origin or animal. 
Information on farm of origin, individual ID, month of birth or entry on farm, sex and aptitude 
(dairy or beef), system of production, movements, and sanitary data are recorded in the system and 
verified by certification entities. Every import of cattle must be reported to the official database and all 
information relating to those animals must be recorded. Whenever an animal dies due to a natural cause, 
accident, or on farm consumption, this information must be given to the authorities. Abattoirs must notify 
which animals were slaughtered and are responsible for transmitting all documents to the Federal 
Inspection Services of the Ministry of Agriculture. These registries make the system quite broad when 
compared with other major exporting countries. Some Brazilian states are proposing their own systems 
with even more breadth, e.g., for organic livestock in Parana (Lewis). 
The Brazilian system has less depth than those of the EU, Japan, and Australia since traceability 
extends only between the farm of origin and the abattoir. Overall, the Brazilian system is comparable to 
those of the EU, Japan, and Australia in terms of breadth. It is as precise as the EU, Japanese, and 
Australian systems as it allows for individual animal identification. It may be less accurate than the 
Australian system because it does not rely on electronic identification. 
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There are two main motivations for the introduction of traceability systems in Brazil: control of 
animal diseases such as FMD and tuberculosis and maintenance of premium beef export markets. 
Brazilian authorities and producers are willing to increase their food safety related costs as they believe 
the price they will get in premium markets largely compensates them. FMD and tuberculosis generate 
costs, not only because it becomes harder to export beef but also because production costs increase. 
Imposing mandatory identification will enable authorities and producers to more easily control or even 
eliminate such diseases, with evident benefits. 
Argentina 
 
Argentina has always been a net beef exporter, although in recent years economic recession and a 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak have had a major impact on export volume. The European 
Union is an important buyer of Argentinean beef, especially of high quality fresh beef cuts imported 
under the Hilton quota. Argentina is considered to be BSE free. 
Animal diseases such as brucellosis, tuberculosis, and Foot and Mouth Disease have yet to be 
totally eradicated in Argentina (SENASA 2003). Due to the persistence of these diseases in the Northwest 
Provinces, Regulation 345/98, issued on April 4, 1998, modified the requirements for beef and other 
ruminants exported to the EU. Every animal destined for export is required to carry a document, signed 
by an official veterinary, assuring that the animal is free of diseases and did not originate in a foreign 
country or province where disease persists. Resolution 625/2002, issued on July 24, 2002, requires that all 
animals exported to the EU must have remained in Argentina for at least 3 months prior to slaughter and 
can only originate from a limited number of countries. This resolution also requires that all facilities 
producing cattle destined for export must have an approved sanitary status and all animals within each 
facility must have an individual Sanitary Certificate assuring that it is free of animal diseases. 
In January 2003, Resolutions 001/2003 and 002/2003 were published to assure traceability to the 
EU by creating procedures to register abattoirs, processing facilities, and feedlots authorized to export 
beef. The central traceability regulation followed in February in Resolution 15/2003 creating the Export 
Cattle Identification System. This system requires mandatory identification of every animal originating on 
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farms and feedlots that is exported. All animals have to bear a tag on the left ear with an individual and 
non-repeatable code, as well as an identification of the farm where it was born. The animal must also 
carry the National Sanitary Register of Livestock Producers brand on its back. Every facility authorized to 
export must register the existence and all movements of animals in a book of registries approved by the 
regional branch of the Argentinean National Service of Agro-Food Safety and Quality. The Resolutions 
on the traceability system took effect in May 2003. 
Argentina has established a limited mandatory system of traceability directed at export markets. 
The depth of the Argentinean system is from the farm to the export port where carcasses or beef cuts 
leave the country. The system is deeper than that of Brazil as it establishes links beyond abattoirs but is 
not as deep as those in Japan, the EU, or Australia because it does not reach retailers or import ports. The 
characteristics recorded are not as broad as those in the Brazilian system and are also more limited than in 
Australia, Japan, or the EU. The system is able to trace back to individual animals and their respective 
farms of origin, but it lacks precision and accuracy as it relies quite extensively on information provided 
by operators and does not employ an integrated database. Another issue with Argentina’s system is that it 
is of limited scope as it only applies to export cattle. 
Argentina is an example of how traceability is limited by economic conditions. The economic 
crisis of 2002 limited the capacity for introducing systems equivalent to those in Australia or Brazil, 
which are direct competitors of Argentina in international beef markets. Legislation was only introduced 
in early 2003 and it seems to have been a reaction to pressures from the EU. Hence in the Argentinean 
case traceability is mainly motivated by trade, as only beef destined for export markets must be identified. 
Given that FMD and other animal diseases are not yet controlled, we would expect to see an economic 
motivation to extend traceability to the rest of cattle herd, as is happening in Brazil. A comparison of 
economic motivations for adoption of traceability in the two countries would make an interesting case 
study. 
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Canada 
The current Canadian approach to beef safety is at a midpoint between the EU and the US 
systems. Full traceability from farm to fork is not mandatory but cattle must be identified when they are 
moved from the farm where they were born to another farm, slaughterhouse, or export. Historically, 
mandatory animal identification was used extensively to assist in eradication of animal diseases such as 
brucellosis and tuberculosis but the system was relaxed after 1985 when those diseases were eradicated. 
In the late 1990s only about 10% of the total cattle herd was identified (CFIA 2000a). However, the 
industry and provincial and federal authorities were prompted to rethink their attitudes towards animal 
identification, by the appearance of the first BSE cases in the UK, the outbreak associated with E. coli in 
the US, and the fact that Canada is highly dependent on export markets. 
In December 2000, Part XV of the Health of Animals Regulations of 1991 was amended to 
include animal identification, to take force in July 2001. The industry led Canadian Cattle Identification 
Agency (CCIA), established in 1998, was mandated to administer the Canadian Identification System 
(CFIA 2000a). Section 175 of the Amendment requires that “every person who owns an animal or has the 
possession, care, or control of it shall ensure that it is identified by an approved tag applied to it before it 
is moved from its farm of origin.” Section 186 specifies procedures for abattoirs. The operator of the 
facility is allowed to remove the tags from animals to be slaughtered but must notify authorities of the 
deaths of the animal and their tag numbers within 30 days. Identification is also required for imported 
cattle, which must be given a Canadian approved tag as they enter the country. In addition, Section 189 
requires that all existing information on imported animals must be referred to the administrator to allow 
trace back to origin. Cattle exported from Canada must also bear an approved tag; importing authorities 
may remove the tag as the animal enters the new country.  
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) enforces this identification system. When tags are 
missing cattle producers pay a fine in terms of the percent of missing tags; if they willfully clip tags out, 
producers have to pay a C$1000 fine. Overall the compliance is estimated to be at a 95% level (Lawrence 
et al.). 
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The Canadian Animal Identification System is not as complex as those in the EU or Japan. Only 
animals that leave the original farm must be identified and only the system’s administrators keep records. 
The system is not as deep as those in the EU and Japan as it does not extend to retail. However it does 
allow tracing back from export ports to original farms. For the domestic market only linkage between 
abattoirs and farms of origin is mandatory. The database maintained by CCIA was instrumental in the 
first Canadian case of BSE in May 2003 for identification of the offspring of the infected cow. Experts 
argue that the system could be improved and officials say that if more information was recorded 1000 of 
the 2,700 animals slaughtered in response to the BSE case could have been spared (Binkley). 
In terms of economic impact, the Canadian Animal Identification System proved useful but by no 
means totally effective in preventing losses when a major crisis arose (Caswell and Sparling). Between 
May and June 2002, at the peak of the BSE crisis, cattle prices dropped by over 50% and exports were 
totally banned (Lawrence et al.). This case helps explain why countries where exports are important (such 
as Canada, Australia, Brazil, and Argentina) are determined to introduce traceability and further quality 
assurance, as this is becoming a condition for access to premium export markets. Much as in the EU and 
Australia, public authorities have contributed significantly to the introduction of traceability in Canada 
but the producers still have to bear the cost of purchasing the tags and providing information to CCIA. 
Since traceability is not extended to retail in Canada, the impact on the supply chain is smaller 
than that already visible in the EU and Japan. Since the system is mandatory, there are not the 
opportunities for beef supply chain competition for domestic markets that exist in the cases of Australia 
and Brazil. However there is international competition with supply chains of these former countries for 
high quality beef markets. Finally, the design of the Canadian system enables authorities to capture all the 
animal health benefits described above. However it falls below the systems of the EU or Japan in terms of 
potential human health benefits as it does not record information beyond abattoirs. 
United States 
Before December 23, 2003, when the first case of BSE was confirmed in Washington State, 
federal authorities did not have a mandatory policy for using traceability to prevent or diminish the impact 
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of animal health or food safety hazards. As a result, the source of the BSE case was only determined some 
time later. 
Golan et al (2004) report the existence of several beef traceability systems in the US. Though 
state authorities have promoted some, they have been mainly private and market driven. Traceability also 
has been mentioned in connection with requirements for Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) for beef, 
other meats, fruits, and vegetables that are a part of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. 
USDA has proposed guidelines but final regulations have not been issued and recently Congress 
approved a 2-year moratorium on this legislation. Furthermore, while the proposed COOL system would 
track country of origin, enabling retailers to label it (e.g., for a beef product whether the animal was born 
and raised in the US), it would not provide traceability that could link a particular animal or beef product 
through the supply chain. In fact, Section 282, (f), (1) states that mandatory identification systems are 
prohibited. 
Earlier events and the Canadian and US BSE cases have changed the perspective on traceability 
of the government and industry in the United States. A team composed of experts representing the 
industry and state and federal authorities are working on a proposal for the creation of the United States 
Animal Identification Plan (USAIP). This effort was initially led by the National Institute for Animal 
Agriculture and is now led by the National Identification Development Team. It is scheduled to work in 
phases, with premise identification targeted for 2004, individual identification for commerce by 2005-
2006, and enhanced technology for tracking by 2005-2006. It is not clear whether the system will be 
voluntary or mandatory (Clapp 2003a and 2004). 
There are currently no mandatory beef traceability systems in the United States. However, 
private, voluntary traceability systems are widespread in industry (Golan et al. 2003a). In August 2003, 
USDA launched the voluntary Beef Export Verification (BEV) program that assures Asian buyers that 
products shipped overseas come from animals slaughtered in the United States. Under this program the 
Agricultural Marketing Service of USDA conducts process verification audits for operators eligible to 
export to Japan under the program (Clapp 2003b). However, this market has been closed since the 
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confirmation of the first BSE case in December 2003. Overall interest in traceability systems is growing 
throughout the supply chain, particularly for the export market and for serving specific consumer 
segments within the United States. 
In the US both public and private authorities are now promoting the introduction of traceability 
systems. They are responding to concerns of international or domestic business partners; hence we would 
expect supply chain dynamics and international demand to be the drivers of traceability in the US. 
Concerns with liability have been one of the main barriers to traceability; many beef producers are 
concerned with the consequences for their businesses if they could be positively associated with an 
animal health or food safety hazard. There is less appreciation of the opportunities for assuring customers 
of quality through traceability. It will be interesting to see how the perceptions of producers of the 
riskiness of traceability change over time. The recent BSE case highlighted the disadvantages in terms of 
slow reaction times of not having any type of national animal identification system. Further analysis will 
be needed to compare the benefits and costs of a voluntary scheme versus adopting a system closer to that 
of Canada or Australia where there is a mandatory identification of animals but many traceability details 
are left to the industry. 
Overall Comparison 
Table 2 summarizes our overview of traceability in beef supply chains in major producing and 
trading countries. There are clearly different approaches to date in establishing these systems. A central 
distinction is between countries that impose mandatory systems, a combination of mandatory and 
voluntary systems, and voluntary systems. The EU and Japan have mandatory traceability; all beef 
produced domestically must be traceable backward and forward from retail to farm of origin. Australia 
and Brazil have plans for general mandatory traceability but traceability is currently mandatory only for 
exported beef, particularly for export to the EU and Japanese markets. Canada has a mandatory animal 
identification scheme for all animals moving away from the farm of origin. This system establishes links 
between farms of origin and abattoirs or export ports, when animals or products are exported. Argentina 
has a mandatory traceability system only for beef being exported; animals and meat sold domestically 
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does not have to be identified, unless it is produced in regions where animal diseases still persist. Finally, 
to date traceability is voluntary in the United States. 
There are also differences between systems in terms of their depth, breadth, and precision. The 
mandatory systems in the EU and Japan are the deepest. They link information on the origin of the animal 
to the retail store through label information on the final package. The Australian system does not link 
abattoirs to retail stores but when beef is exported the containers and their contents are registered in the 
system, allowing for importing agents to use such information. Brazil, Japan, Australia, and the EU have 
the broadest systems, although in most cases systems can be implemented on a broader scale on a 
voluntary basis. Canada and, especially, Argentina have simpler traceability systems in terms of breadth. 
Japan, the EU, Australia, and Brazil have developed the most precise systems as individual animals and 
their farms of origin can be linked with beef products. All these systems rely on verification by public or 
private auditors. In addition, Japan is using DNA samples to confirm the accuracy of databases. The 
Australian beef traceability system is based on electronic tagging, which is reported to be very accurate in 
gathering and recording information. Canada and Argentina depend on the information given by farmers 
and processors, with no public or private verification. 
CONCLUSION 
Traceability is already changing the international beef market. It is becoming clear that there are 
at least two types of beef markets according to the ability to trace. The question is whether in the future 
all traded beef will be traced according to its different attributes or there will still be a place for beef that 
is not fully traceable. Most beef exporting countries are adopting some kind of traceability system in 
response to mandatory systems introduced in such important importing countries for high quality beef 
cuts as Japan and the European Union. The exporters’ main motivation is to maintain or increase their 
positions in international markets for beef. 
Traceability systems are a way to assure that credible information on credence attributes, such as 
food safety, flows across agri-food marketing chains from farm to fork. These systems are developing at a 
different rate across trading partners. In many countries, traceability is being instituted first in the beef 
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supply chain. The European Union and Japan are leading the trend toward adoption of mandatory 
traceability to prevent or diminish risks to animal and human health. They have the broadest, deepest, and 
most precise beef traceability systems. Australia and Brazil, where the beef export market is important, 
are closely following this trend. Argentina and Canada have recently adopted mandatory traceability 
systems but they are less extensive than the EU or Japanese systems. The United States has not adopted 
mandatory traceability systems, although several voluntary systems are operating and new systems are 
being developed. 
The economic implications of mandatory and voluntary traceability systems are just beginning to 
be played out. They will be especially prominent in the areas of animal and human health, international 
trade, and supply chain dynamics. The countries that have already adopted traceability systems have 
positioned themselves to gain the economic benefits of such systems, either domestically or in export 
markets. The extent to which these benefits justify the costs of such systems and how benefits and costs 
will be distributed remains to be fully analyzed. Overall, it is clear that traceability will become an 
increasingly integral feature of markets for food products. 
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 Table 1. Beef and veal production and trade 
 
     
Country/year   1999 2000 2001 
Production (MT)a 7,679,182 7,418,295 7,343,842 
Import (MT) 198,707 201,865 201,865 European Union 
Export (MT) 692,338 440,143 440,143 
Production (MT) 540,377 530,438 458,034 
Import (MT) 677,373 719,354 674,938 Japan 
Export (MT) 120 165 63 
Production (MT) 2,010,530 1,987,902 2,080,000 
Import (MT) 1,314 1,048 924 Australia 
Export (MT) 913,824 929,797 970,642 
Production (MT) 6,413,300 6,540,000 6,671,000 
Import (MT) 37,485 50,895 31,041 Brazil 
Export (MT) 150,740 188,656 368,287 
Production (MT) 2,719,784 2,718,000 2,452,000 
Import (MT) 11,934 10,271 10,516 Argentina 
Export (MT) 159,956 159,837 42,822 
Production (MT) 1,263,816 1,264,138 1,249,956 
Import (MT) 177,783 184,261 212,480 Canada 
Export (MT) 370,438 394,168 434,793 
Production (MT) 12,123,000 12,298,000 11,983,000 
Import (MT) 882,047 953,142 987,463 United States 
Export (MT) 766,212 899,834 780,515 
  
aMetric tons. 
 
Source: FAOSTAT.
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Table 2. Comparison of country-level beef traceability systems in terms of depth, breadth, and precisiona 
 
Country System
Typeb 
 
Depthc 
 
Breadthc 
 
Precisionc 
Integrity 
Verificationc 
Feed
producers 
to retail 
 Retail 
to 
farm 
 
Farm 
to 
abattoir 
Abattoir 
to retail 
Abattoir 
to 
export 
ports 
Abattoir 
to import 
ports 
Safety 
and 
origin 
Safety, 
origin, 
animal 
welfare, 
feed and 
others 
Individual 
animals to 
their place 
of birth 
Groups 
of 
animals 
to place 
of birth 
DNA Other
EU              B P X X X X P X X P X
Japan               B P X X X X X X
Australia             ME X X X P X P  
Brazil              ME X X X X
Argentina ME             X X X X
Canada               M X X X X
US              V P P P P P
   
 
aGolan et al. (2003a) define breadth as the amount of information recorded by the system, depth as how far backward and forward traceability is maintained, and 
precision as the ability of the system to pinpoint the original source of a problem. 
 
bM=Mandatory, V=Voluntary , B= Both Mandatory and Voluntary, ME=Mandatory for Export. 
cX=characteristic of present system, P=potential characteristic of system. 
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